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This study explains the life of John William Powell with
particular emphasis on his experience as the editor The China
Weekly Review in Shanghai after World War II, and the
difficulty he went through after he returned to the United
States during the McCarthy era.
Powell was born in China, but was reared mainly in the
United States. He attended the University of Missouri School
of Journalism. After America entered World War II, Powell went
to work in the Office of War Information.
In 1945, Powell went to Shanghai to restart the Review,
which his father, J.B. Powell, had edited and owned. The
journal, known to be critical of Japan's aggression in Asia,
was shut down during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai, and
his father was physically incapacitated in Japanese jails.
During the Korean War, Powell hailed the Chinese entry into
the war, and echoed Chinese and North Korean charges that the
United States was engaged in germ warfare. The Review
purportedly was used by the Chinese for ideological
indoctrination in U.S. POW camps. Failure to comply with the
indoctrination was reported to have resulted in the death of
U.S. prisoners.
Powell eventually closed down the Review because of
increasing financial losses, and returned to the United States
with his family in 1953. After his return, the Powells faced
Congressional hearings and later the government charged him
with treason and sedition. The ordeal cost him dearly, both
professionally and economically, but finally the government
dropped all the charges against him in 1961 for lack of
evidence.
This study of Powell's writings concludes that he did not
knowingly falsify anything, but he was not as objective as he
could have been in his reporting. The issue of germ warfare
remains open. Except for that, most of what Powell reported
about the war actually happened.
Western historians
interpreted same facts differently, but the differences are
largely matters of opinion or are rooted in differing cultural
perspectives. Today, Powell remains as convinced as he was
then about his germ warfare charges.
Powell's case shows journalists how difficult it is to cover
a foreign country when tension is high between nations. It
also shows that journalists can be easily manipulated or led
astray by propaganda and the lack of adequate information.
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Chapter One.

Of all the

Introduction

China Hands,a

group of American foreign

service officers and journalistswho were

accused of being

overly sympathetic to the Chinese Communists during and after
World War II, John William Powell perhaps suffered the most
and the

longest from McCarthy ism.

He was

among the

few

Americans to stay in China after the Communists took over.
After he came back, he faced the charges of sedition and
treason, and lost his newspaper career.
He was also the most controversial of the China Hands.
Considered to be a "fearless and fair" journalist by his
colleagues in the news profession at one time, he would later
be characterized

by them as a

Newsweek article

labeled him.

turncoat"Red China Boy" as a

Powell was born in Shanghai, the son of a prominent
American journalist, John Benjamin Powell. Both he and his
father were educated at the University of Missouri School of
Journalism. He worked in 1940 as a newsman in China before
joining the U.S. Office of War Information as an editor at the
start of World War II.
In 1945, he took over his father's paper, The China
Weekly Review, in Shanghai. His father, who had edited the
Review since 1917 and had purchased it in 1922, had been a
strong supporter of the Chinese Nationalists and an outspoken
critic of Japanese militarism.
As the Chinese Nationalists desperately tried in the post
1

2

World War II years to impose their rule on China, the Review,
under the operation of Powell, grew increasingly critical of
the

regime.

Its

editorials

and

essays

highlighted

the

inefficiency, cruelty, corruption and press censorship of the
Nationalist government. Powell's wife, Sylvia, and another
American journalist, Julian Schuman, also worked at the Review
at that time.
After the Communists took over mainland China in 1949,
the Review, having changed to a monthly, published laudatory
reports of the conditions in Communist-held territories. It
became the only English-language paper to be published in
China after 1949.
During

the

Korean

War,

the

magazine

devoted

much

attention to criticizing American military and diplomatic
policies. From 1951 to 1953, Powell published a variety of
stories detailing China and North Korea's germ warfare charges
against the United States. The American government, however,
discredited Powell for his views. When he returned to the
United States with his wife and two small children in 1954, he
found a hostile environment.
A congressional committee

interrogated him and then

lobbied hard for his prosecution. The State Department and
some military officials, angry over the Review's the germ
warfare charges, also sought to punish Powell.
He was indicted in early 1956 for sedition,

but the

proceeding resulted in a mistrial nearly three years later.

3

Despite repeated threats by the U.S. government that he would
be retried or indicted for treason, no more efforts were made
to prosecute him. Finally, in 1961, U.S. Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy ordered the sedition indictment dismissed
and closed the investigation of treason charges on grounds
that evidence proving an overt act of treason was impossible
to obtain.
To defend themselves, Powell and his wife, Sylvia, spent
more than $4 0,000 of their own savings and funds raised on
their behalf. Because of the political environment of that
time,

they

could

not

find

jobs

in

the

United

States.

Effectively "blacklisted" by newspapers, Powell eventually
read a book on carpentry and developed a new career renovating
Victorian houses in San Francisco.

He still maintains his

interest in China and germ warfare.
"Because of what I wrote critically— indeed harshly— of
America's China policy and of my country's role in the Korean
War," he said in 1984, "we had seven difficult years. They
were frightening, time-consuming, and horribly expensive." He
condemned those who "try— and sometimes succeed— in shaping
the news to fit their own narrow interests," because they "do
their countries a great disservice."
Throughout

the

years,

Powell

persisted

in

securing

classified documents in an attempt to prove the truth of what
he had written in the early 1950s. The charges regarding
American use of bacteriological weapons during the Korean War

4

remain

unproved.

The

truth

undoubtedly

lies

buried

in

governmental archives in Washington and Beijing.
However, recent evidence shows that the U.S. Army used
Japanese personnel to assist its bacteriological warfare
programs after World War II. This, some scholars argued, tends
to support Powell's contention. But some government officials
knew about the Army's use of Japanese military personnel
before the indictment against Powell was prepared.
probably the government's

intention,

scholars

It was

argued,

to

suppress anything that might even imply, let alone prove, that
it had engaged in germ warfare.
The purpose of the thesis is to study Powell's writings
in

the Review to see whether he objectively reported the

Korean War. To achieve this goal, news sources and Powell's
stands on various issues will be studied in detail. The author
will also compare the Review's coverage of the Communist germ
warfare charges with that of other U.S. media such as The New
York Times.
In the next few chapters, an effort is made to put Powell
and his magazine

into historical perspective,

so that a

conclusion can be made as to how responsibly Powell had
behaved. Was he, like other old China Hands, an innocent
victim of the Red scare of the 1940s and 1950s, or did he
contribute to his difficulties by failing to meet American
standards of responsible, fair-minded journalism?

Chapter Two.

The United States and China:
A Historical Review

U.S. contact with China started more than one hundred and
fifty years before John William Powell took over The China
Weekly Review. Since 1784, when the American ship "Empress of
China" arrived to trade at the port of Canton in the middle of
the Qing dynasty(1644-1911), relations between the United
States and China had been mainly centered around bilateral
trade. The first treaty between the United States and China,
the

Wangsha

Treaty,

was

signed

in

1844.

Through

this

agreement, the United States secured the same trade rights
that the British had won from China in the Opium War(18391842) , and also a promise to enjoy all future privileges given
by China to other nations.
Other trade agreements in the nineteenth century, the
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 and the Burlingame Treaty of 1868,
contained most-favored nation clauses. As a result of these
treaties, whenever a Western country compelled China to grant
new demands in the next hundred years or so, the same benefits
passed automatically to the Americans.1
The first American minister to the empire of China was
Anson Burlingame, appointed by President Abraham Lincoln in
1861. He negotiated China's first bilateral agreement with a
Western power, thus making America the first occidental nation
1 Michael Shaller, The United States and China in the
Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), p. 14.
5

6

to recognize China as an equal. Burlingame was known to be the
sole Western diplomat to often walk out of his office to meet
with Chinese workers and officials. His sincere effort to
understand the complexities of the Chinese society gained him
unusual

confidence

in

the

Chinese

imperial

court.

His

influence on America's China policy left its mark thirty years
later when Secretary of State John Hay enunciated the Open
Door Policy in 1899.2

Under the policy,

foreign nations

received equal opportunity for trade with China and promised
to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity.
Because the United States was a latecomer to the China
trade, American interests were in securing equal access to
Chinese markets. China's sovereignty was only a secondary
consideration for the U.S. government.3 Besides the desire of
trading profits, there was also a strong moral element to U.S.
involvement

with

China.

The

first

American

missionaries

arrived in 1811. Although relatively few in number,

they

became enormously influential in Chinese intellectual circles
and in forming American perceptions of China. Virtually every
denomination in the United States at the turn of this century
had its China mission society, and U.S. congregations received
periodic missionary reports praising the good qualities of the
2 John Tierney, Jr., About Face: The China Decision and
Its Consequences (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1979) ,
P. 126.
3 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China: The Interplay of
Politics and Journalism (New York and London: The Guilford
Press, 1990), p. 203.

7

Chinese people and pointing to their desperate need for food,
medicine, and modern education.4
By the 1890s, about 1,500 U.S. missionaries were working
in China. Of particular importance were the many mission-run
schools and universities established throughout China. These
schools became the primary means whereby Chinese intellectuals
learned about Western thought.
The U.S. military also had a role in early Sino-American
relations. U.S. forces regularly protected American traders
and missionaries, and a sizable contingent of Marines was
deployed to assist in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion
in 1900. Most of the money received by the United States as
indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion was used to educate Chinese
students in the United States.5
The most emotional issue in early Sino-American relations
was Chinese immigration to the United States. Thousands of
Chinese

were

recruited

to

help

build

the

first

transcontinental railways across the United States during the
1850s and 18 60s. But racist actions against the Chinese swept
the western states. In the 1880s, the U.S. Congress passed a
series of laws restricting further immigration of the Chinese
and

requiring

resident

identification

wherever

Chinese
they

to
went.

register
Angered

and

carry

by

this

4 Martin L. Lasater, Policy in Evolution: The U.S. Role
in China's Reunification (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1989), p. 8.
5 Ibid.

discrimination, Chinese students led boycotts against American
goods in China during the early part of this century.6
1. Early American Journalism in China
U.S.

economic and cultural contacts with the Far East

brought the first wave of American journalists to China. Most
ofthem arrived in1900 to report the lifting of the Boxer
Siege and

then, in 1905, returned for the Russo-Japanese War

in Manchuria. Few of these correspondents actually remained in
the Far East, however.
The core group of American correspondents assigned to
China in the year 1909 was tiny. It comprised two men in
Beijing (from The Associated Press and the New York Herald),
and Thomas F.F. Millard, a former war correspondent for the
Herald, who

also

represented several

other papers

as a

correspondent-at-large. Reporting for the New York Herald from
Hong Kong was Australian journalist W. H. Donald. These men
were ahead of their time in U. S. journalism because before
the First World War, the U.S. press did not have specialists
in foreign nations. International news was the domain of Great
Britain.7
American correspondent Thomas Millard was a pioneer who
belonged to no tradition in American journalism and who

6 Lasater, Policy in Evolution, p. 8.
7 I have relied for much of the history of early of
American journalism in China on Peter Rand's "A Quixotic
Adventure: The American Press in China, 1900-1950." The
article appeared in Chin-Chuan Lee's Voices of China.

9

created the role of the China Hand as journalist to which
successive

generations

of

American

reporters

adapted

themselves. Theodore Roosevelt was a fan of Thomas Millard's
journalism. He admired Millard's anti-British dispatches from
the Boer War and his Russo-Japanese War reports. The president
encouraged Millard to educate the American public about China
through books and magazine articles. He urged

Millard to

transform public indifference into popular support for a
strong pro-China policy. Millard did so with zeal and made
China his business, impressing Chinese government officials
with his access to Americans in high places and becoming an
intermediary in the promotion of American bank loans to China.
Being an expansionist and a democratic idealist, Millard used
journalism as a tool to spread his ideas about American
expansion in the Far East and at the same time to advance the
economic interest of China in Washington against those of
Great

Britain

and

Japan.

He

was

fundamentally

anti

imperialist, especially anti-British and anti-Japanese, and
believed that expanding American commerce in China would bring
with it special benefits for the Chinese people.8
American readership then knew very little about China.
Therefore, most of the journalists wrote books or published
treaty-port newspapers for American business subscribers in
Shanghai and other coastal ports.

Millard established an

English language newspaper, The China Press and, an English
8 Lee, Voices of China, pp. 204-205.

10

weekly journal,

Millard's Review of the Far East. These

journalists stayed in China partly because the colonial life
gave them a sense of importance. They were at the top of the
heap, socially and economically. Underneath it all, though,
the motive that inspired U.S. correspondents to live and work
in China was the strong attachment they formed to the Chinese
people and their national aspirations. It was this feeling
that influenced how they wrote about China and gave the
profession of reporting from China its guixotic character.
During his

involvement

in China,

Millard

sought to

improve Sino-American communications and help China break the
British monopoly of the news by giving the Chinese the means
of quickly presenting their point of view. Later, he joined
the Chinese government as a political advisor and remained in
that position for several years.9
A godfather figure, Millard was an enthusiastic supporter
of the Missouri School of Journalism.10 His "anti-colonial,
anti-imperialist, pro-independence, pro-Republican and

pro-

American" values were passed on to the new generations of
journalists in China through J.B. Powell, who was the father
of John William Powell.

An instructor at the University of

9 John Maxwell Hamilton, "The Missouri News Monopoly and
American Altruism in China: Thomas F.F. Millard, J.B. Powell,
and Edgar Snow," Pacific Historical Review (February 1986), p.
33
10 Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting:
An Oral History of American Journalism in the 193 0s & 1940s
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California
Press, 1987), p. 25.
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Missouri School of Journalism, J.B. Powell went to China in
1917 at the invitation of Millard to run Millard's Review of
the

Far

East. He stayed on in China

for 25 years

eventually bought Millard's journal, which he renamed

and
The

China Weekly Review.
Dean Walter Williams, founder of the Missouri journalism
school,

had recommended Powell

to Millard.

Williams had

visited the Far East and was responsible for creating a Far
East study program at the University of Missouri that prepared
future journalists for China. Williams also contributed to the
growth of professionalism in the Chinese press. He established
the exchange program between the schools of journalism at
Missouri

and

Yenching

University

in

Peking.

Missouri

instructors were sent to teach at the first journalism school
in China at Yenching and Chinese students traveled to Missouri
to study journalism.11
During the 192 0s and 1930s, more than 40 graduates of the
Missouri Journalism School found their way to China. Besides
Millard and J.B. Powell, others who were well-known among this
"Missouri mafia" were: Carl Crow, the first city editor of The
China Press and author of Guide Book to China, a "bible" for
tourists; Emily Hanh, whose books— The Soonq Sisters and China
to Me— were bestsellers; and

Edgar Snow, who later ventured

11 Peter Rand, "A Quixotic Adventure," p. 206.

12

into the Communist-held area and wrote Red Star Over China.12
Another writer on Asian topics was Agnes Smedley,

a

native of Missouri, although she was not generally associated
with the University of Missouri. Having traveled extensively
and resided in Shanghai, she became popular in America for her
books, The Daughter of the Earth and Battle Hymn of China.
2. China's Civil War and the War With Japan
In 1927, when a series of domestic events finally put
China in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, the country seemed less
chaotic to the world than it had been before.

The U.S.

government adopted a laissez-faire policy in the Far East
after the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. With the belief
that nothing seriously affecting America's Far East policy
would happen, the U.S. government withdrew from the area as an
active force to be reckoned with.13
In the

few years

after

1927,

Chiang was

primarily

concerned with the extermination of the Communists and their
sympathizers, who were forced to the countryside to wage
guerilla warfare. With the support of the powerful in China
and

industrialized

nations

increasingly assertive

in

the

West,

in his efforts

to

Chiang

became

control

China.

Finally, in 1935 after the famous Long March through mountains
and

rivers

in

the

west,

the

Red

Army

established

its

12 John B. Powell, "Missouri Authors and Journalists in
the Orient," Missouri Historical Review. October 194 6, pp. 4555.
13 Rand, "A Quixotic Adventure," p. 207.
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headquarters

in

Yenan,

its

wartime

capital

in

Shaanxi

Province.
The fight for legitimacy between the Nationalists and the
Communists was complicated by Japan's invasion of Manchuria in
1931. Japan's invasion posed a direct challenge to U.S. faith
in the Far Eastern status quo and also to the League of
Nations. The invasion was a major international story. So was
the outbreak of war in Shanghai, in early 1932, when Japanese
soldiers met the heroic resistance of the Chinese army in
street

fighting

and

retaliated

by

bombing

the

civilian

population.
Japanese

aggression

in

Manchuria

resulted

in

establishment of the puppet state of Manchuguo, under the
sponsorship of Japan. However, the top echelons of the U.S.
government did not perceive Japan as a

potential threat to

world peace until the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, when
Japan began its massive drive into the heart of China. U.S.
passivity up to that time was reflected in the scarcity of
China news in the U.S. press.
Events of enormous consequence for China's future were
happening throughout the decade of the 1930s. They received
very little attention in the U.S. press, even though American
journalists in China were not only documenting them, but
becoming increasingly involved in them. To some of the older
correspondents in China, like J.B. Powell and Thomas Millard,
who wanted a China free and strong for American business, the

14

great threat was Japan, and the most prominent figure on the
national scene was Chiang Kai-shek, for he seemed to have
brought some stability to the country, with the financial help
of the Shanghai business community.
The Sino-Japanese War significantly weakened the very
foundation of the Nationalists, draining away their resources
and energies, whereas the Communists took advantage of the
opportunities and expanded their strength and influence in the
rural areas.14 Through his paid lobbyists, Chiang enlisted
abundant military and material support from the United States.
President Roosevelt sent his envoy, General Joseph Stilwell,
to China to coordinate the distribution of U.S. military aid
and

to

Stilwell

organize
soon

Chiang's

saw

a

armies

corrupt

and

to

fight

the Japanese.

incompetent

government

hoarding military aid for the coming civil war.
The American government seemed to be wedded to the
Chinese Nationalists.15 From Pearl Harbor until V-J Day, the
American government sought to win Chiang's cooperation in
defeating Japan. However, Chiang's primary goal was to curtail
the growth of the Communists. This difference in primary aims
resulted in increased tension between Chiang and Stilwell.
Ultimately,

Chiang maneuvered to have President Roosevelt

recall General Stilwell.
14 Paul Gordon Lauren(ed.), The China Hands' Legacy:
Ethics and Diplomacy (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1987), p.3.
15 Ibid. , p. 144 .

15

In order to maintain political support within the United
States, Chiang also tried to control the American journalists
in China by means of censorship.

As the Japanese advanced,

Chiang moved to the remote fortress city of Chungking in
Sichuan Province. There, any story about the Nationalists
corruption, or articles critical of the Nationalist Chinese
war

effort,

information,

would

be

killed

by

Chiang's

minister

of

Hollington Tong, who was also a graduate of

Missouri's journalism school.
The China beat journalists included Theodore White and
Annalee Jacoby of Time; Arch Steele of the Chicago Daily News,
a highly respected veteran who later was regarded as the dean
of American correspondents in the Far East; Brooks Atkinson
and Tillman Durdin of The New York Times; Jack Belden of
International News Service; and

Hugh Deane of the Christian

Science Monitor.16
Being relatively later arrivals on the China scene, these
journalists were young, idealistic and adventurous. They were
not city-bound and saw for themselves the misery and chaos of
rural China. Some of the new journalists, such as Edgar Snow,
Arch Steele, Tillman Durdin and Harold Isaacs, had actually
shipped to China on an adventure and then stayed. Steele and
Durdin eventually became correspondents accredited to major
U.S. papers. Snow worked for The China Weekly Review, then
16 Charles Hood, "The China Hands' Experience: Journalists
and Diplomacy," in Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, pp.157158.

16

became a correspondent for the London

Daily Telegraph and a

contributor to the Saturday Evening Post. Harold Issacs and
Durdin both went to work, upon their arrival in China, for
Hollington Tong (then editor of the China Press in Shanghai).
Isaacs soon quit, travelled up the Yangtze River, and became
a dedicated muckraker,

while Durdin joined The New York

Times.17
Agnes Smedley, another journalist, took up first the
cause of persecuted Chinese urban intellectuals of the late
1920s and early 1930s, and later the cause of the Chinese
Communists. Smedley, Issacs, Snow, and his wife, Nym Wales,
whom he had met in Shanghai in 1931 and married in 1932, were
all China advocates in the tradition of Thomas Millard. One
way or another they all went to bat for the Chinese,

as

Millard had done. They all eventually wrote important books
about China, and, like Millard, they were all put to use by
their Chinese friends. Millard's connections were Republican
Chinese of an earlier day. Millard was still in China during
the 1930s, however, working as an advisor to the Nationalists
in Nanjing.
Americans were of special value to the Communist cause
because they could work in China under the protection of
extraterritoriality,

outside Chinese jurisdiction.

with the encouragement of Mme.

Sun Yat-sen,

17 Lee, Voices of China, p. 209.

Isaacs,

exposed the

17

Nationalists' terror through his publication China Forum,
which received most of its material from underground Chinese
Communists. Mme. Sun was said to have acted as the liaison
between the Communists and Edgar Snow, and helped to arrange
Snow's trip to the Communist headquarters in the Shaanxi
Province, in 193 6, which resulted in Red Star Over China. The
book brought the first impressions of Mao's Communist movement
to those outside of China.
This period was also connected with the name of Henry
Luce, publisher and editor of the Time magazine. Luce was
romantic about Chiang,
Nationalist movement.
China and

his wife Soong Mei-ling,

and the

Luce was strongly opinionated about

Chiang Kai-shek in particular. Through his foreign

editor, Whittaker Chambers, Luce routinely altered dispatches
of Time's correspondents, Annalee Jacoby and Theodore White.
Jacoby later recalled that her stories and interviews in Time
were doctored.

Her interviews with major Chinese figures

contained questions that she did not ask and answers nobody
ever gave her.18
The image that Luce created was of a heroic China under
the valiant leadership of Chiang fighting the Japanese for the
United States. This impression of the Nationalists given by
Luce

and

Americans.

his
It

journals,
also

Time

influenced

and

Life. influenced

President

Roosevelt,

many
who

insisted on giving Nationalist China a place among the Big
18 MacKinnon, China Reporting, pp. 138-139.

18

Four Powers.19
While alienated by the censorship of Chiang and Luce, the
U.S. reporters enjoyed relatively good relationships with Chou
En-lai, the charismatic Communist spokesman in Chungking, and
his beautiful press attache, Gong Peng. The superior public
relations of the Chou can be vividly illustrated by the way he
courted the U.S. reporters. According to Durdin, Chou En-lai
would say to Americans,

"One of my top personalities in

history is Thomas Jefferson. One of my aspirations is to go to
the United States someday, and please come to Yenan and see
u s ."20

The majority of American journalists had come to China
predisposed to be suspicious of Communists. But once they
stayed

in

China

for

some

time,

they

found

that

the

Nationalists were a very unreliable source of information.21
These

journalists

found themselves caught

in an

ethical

dilemma of whether to report objectively what they witnessed
in China or to give moral encouragement to the U.S. ally while
honoring the censorship.
With Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Sino-Japanese War
became part of World War II. Nationalist China suddenly became
an ally of the United States. Since Chiang had been resisting
19 Harrison E. Salisbury, "China Reporting: Red Star to
Long March," pp.221-222. The paper appeared in Chin-Chuan
Lee's Voices of China.
20 MacKinnon, China Reporting, p. 85.
21 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 164.
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Japanese aggressors for four years, it was widely believed
that Chiang was a brilliant leader and could fight off the
Japanese in Asia for the United States. But the American
journalists on the China beat who knew this was not true found
it extremely difficult to dissuade the public of the fantasy.
These journalists saw the nature of Chiang's regime, and the
potential
minister

of
of

Mao's

Communist

movement.

information would delete

The

even

Nationalist

the

slightest

criticism of his government.22
While the Nationalist statements could not be trusted,
the Communist's were always guestionable because there was no
way

to

confirm

their

accounts.

So,

by

1944,

foreign

correspondents became extremely anxious to see the Communist
area of the country from which they had been barred for a long
time.

The group that was allowed to visit Yenan in 1944

included Brooks Atkinson; Theodore H. White; Harrison Forman
of the New York Herald Tribune; Israel Epstein of Allied Labor
News and who also reported for The New York Times and Time
magazine; Gunther Stein of The Christian Science Monitor;
Father Cormac Shanahan, editor of the Catholic Monthly and
China Correspondent and correspondent for The Sign; and N.
Protsenko, China manager of the Tass News Agency.23
The ensuing reports presented a very favorable impression
22 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 142.
23 Warren W. Tozer, "The Foreign Correspondents' Visit to
Yenan in 1944: A Reassessment," Pacific Historical Review. May
1972, p. 210.

20

of the Communists: their land reclamation, self-sufficiency on
agricultural

production,

well-trained

troops,

democratic

government, and so on. The reports provoked bitter criticism
from the Nationalist government of China and its supporters in
the United States. Some critics have concluded that these
reporters exhibited strong pro-Communist— or at least, antiNationalist— bias.

As a result,

the arguments

goes,

the

American public became disillusioned with Chiang Kai-shek's
Nationalist regime.
Of all who visited Yenan, only Father Cormac Shanahan
presented a somewhat negative picture of the Communists.24
Except for the admission that the people in Yenan were wellfed and the Communist troops were in good spirits, he said
that there was no freedom in Yenan and people there were
strictly controlled.

But, Father Shanahan's writings were

mostly discredited as being too much distorted or full of
contradictions.25
When the war was over, most China beat journalists faced
charges of "harming the interests of the United States—
charges ranging from "poor judgment" and "disloyalty" to
"sedition" and even "treason."26 These are exactly the same
charges that Powell faced later when he returned from China in

24 Tozer, "The Foreign Correspondents' Visit to Yenan in
1944," p. 218.
25 Ibid. , p. 219.
26 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 27.
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1953. When the Chinese Communists forced the Nationalists to
flee to the island of Taiwan and the Korean War broke out,
McCarthyism

emerged

as

an

important

political

force

in

America. Named after former U.S. senator, Joseph McCarthy,
McCarthyism refers to the Communist hysteria that many believe
he helped foment during the early 1950s. Those journalists who
has written favorable reports about the Communists found
themselves

under

enormous pressure.

Theodore White was

charged with losing China to the Reds and Annalee Jacoby was
charged with being a "Communist." John William Powell was
accused of betraying America's cause in the Far East.
When

McCarthyism

abated

in

the

United

States,

journalists who had been identified as security risks had that
stigma removed by the government. But for some of them, their
reputations as journalists were ruined. Mac Fisher, who had
been a reporter for United Press in Chungking, was later
barred from holding any decision-making positions
United States Information Agency.

in the

John W. Powell lost his

journalism career and had to turn to renovating Victorian
houses in San Francisco. Today, most of the reporters still
think they did a pretty good job covering China. Steele later
said: " We reported things as we saw them. What we saw was
that

the Nationalists were

in chaotic

disarray

and the

Communists were winning the war. This wasn't pro-Communist
reporting. It was objective reporting.1,27
27 Hood, "The China Hand's Experience,"

p. 167.
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About
journalists

forty

years

had the

later,

chance

these

old

again to gather

China

Hands

together

at

Scottsdale, Arizona, for the conference— "War Reporting: China
in

the

1940s."

The

meeting

was

the

brainchild

of

two

University of Arizona history professors. When these veteran
war reporters were again asked the guestion of whether they
were biased in favor of the Chinese Communists, the answer was
"No." They were all aware, they said, of efforts by both the
Nationalists and the Communists to manipulate them and that
they were skeptical of both parties and reported what they saw
and knew.28
After the Communists took over the mainland and the
Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan, the relationship
worsened between the new nation— the People's Republic of
China— on the mainland, and the United States. The hostility
culminated in the Korean War in the early 1950s. After 1949,
only one paper, Powell's The China Weekly Review, continued
its presence in China under the new regime. The paper soon
became embroiled in controversy over its coverage of the early
Communist regime and the Korean War.

28 MacKinnon, China Reporting, p. 149.

Chapter Three. The China Weekly Review and the Powells

1.

J.B. Powell and the Review

John William Powell was born in Shanghai in 1919, where
his father edited The China Weekly Review, a respected English
language journal of news and opinion about Chinese affairs.
John W. Powell came to the United States when he was a little
over one year old, and returned to China at the age of six. In
1927, when Chiang Kai-shek moved against the Communists and
took the city of Shanghai, Powell's father sent him and his
sister, Martha, to the United States, where he went to school
in Hannibal and Columbia, Missouri. He was mainly reared in
the United States.
After graduation from high school in 1938, Powell studied
at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, from which
his

father graduated as a member of its first

journalism

class. In the fall 1940, he decided to take a break from
school and went back to Shanghai in 1941 to work for The China
Press. an English language newspaper owned by one of Chiang
Kai-shek's closest associates,

H.H.

Kung.

He did mostly

general reporting and rewrite work. During the evenings, he
worked for his father's magazine, The China Weekly Review.
After staying less than a year in China, Powell came back
to the United States and continued his education at the
Missouri School of Journalism. He had altogether three years
of journalism education, but was never graduated from college.
He wanted to join the military when the United States entered
23
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World War II. However, poor eyesight kept him from doing so.
Instead, he joined the government, first working with the
Federal Communications Commission, and then as a news editor
with

the

Office

of

War

Information.

After

working

in

Washington and New York for a year, he was assigned in 1943 to
Chungking to work with the press and psychological warfare
services.

He dropped

leaflets

out

of

army

bombers

over

occupied Hong Kong and Canton.1
Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese
had arrested Powell's father, J.B. Powell, and put him into
prison, where he suffered frostbite on his feet. In 1945 when
the Japanese surrendered, the elder Powell was too ill to
return to China from the United States, so Powell left OWI and
assumed control of the Review.
The journal had been first founded by Thomas Millard,
the

pioneer American

journalist

in China,

Millard's Review of the Far East.

The

who
first

named

it

issue of

Millard's magazine came out on June 9, 1917. Millard used the
journal to try to break with the colonial convention of
ignoring native news and to rebut allegations that might
injure China's national prestige and credit.2 In 1922, when
Millard began to advise the Chinese government full time, he
sold the magazine to his editor, J.B. Powell.

1 Powell interview, March 19-2 3, 1993 in San Francisco.
2 Hamilton,
Altruism," p.34.

"The Missouri News Monopoly and American
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The elder Powell had edited the Review since 1917. He had
been teaching at the Missouri School of Journalism when
Millard cabled Dean Williams to recommend an editor. It was
the first transoceanic telegram that J.B. Powell had ever
seen. Throughout the years he spent in China, J.B. Powell and
his wife lived simply, dressed casually and befriended all
kinds of people, even those who disagreed with them.
One of the first things he did as the owner of the
magazine was to change its name, Millard's Review of the Far
East. because

he

thought

that

it

"too

restrictive

personal."3 He experimented with several names,

and

the first

being The Weekly Review of the Far East, and finally in June
1923, The China Weekly Review was adopted.

Interestingly,

considering the special importance and respect Chinese usually
give to established names, J.B. Powell continued to use the
paper's original Chinese language name— Millard's Review of
the Far East. Except for the title which was in both English
and Chinese, the content of the journal was in English only.
J.B. Powell established the Review in the style of the
New Republic of Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly, which was
then regarded as the most attractive journal in America.4 He
pretty much kept Millard's independent, anti-imperialist, and
pro-China approach. Most of the readers were young Chinese

3 J.B. Powell, Mv Twenty Five Years in China (New York:
Macmillan, 1945), p.90.
4 Ibid., p.14.
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intellectuals, students of mission and municipal schools, who
were very concerned with international issues. Then there was
the Anglo-American community in Shanghai,
around

10,000.

Other

readers

which numbered

included

Scandinavians, Frenchmen, Germans, and

Shanghai-based

Russians.

J.B. Powell did not like Communism and sided with the
Nationalists when they began to expand their zone of control.
He maintained a steady defense of the Nationalists, often
citing American history to boost his points. When Chiang's
military units occupied missionary schools and property, the
Review noted that William and Mary College had been occupied
by American, British and French forces during the American
revolution and by the Confederate and Union troops during the
American Civil War.
"America became politically independent at the close of
the revolution against Great Britain," the Review said on
Sept.

8,

1928,

"but

did

not

become

financially

and

economically independent from Europe until quite recently."5
The rationalization was that it would take time for the
Nationalists to develop their country, especially in face of
Japanese intrusions and domestic turmoil.
J.B. Powell realized that Chiang was a authoritarian
leader, and the Nationalists' corruption and press censorship
seriously disturbed him. However, even when the Communists
began to receive favorable coverage from others in the mid5 The China Weekly Review. Sept. 8, 1928.
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193 0s, he did not give much attention to them. In 1945, he
wrote in Reader's Digest that Chiang was moving toward a
democratic republic.
However, as evidence of his interest in providing both
sides of an issue, he would regularly run stories in the
Review by pro-Communist radicals like Agnes Smedley and Anna
Louise Strong, with whom he disagreed, and gave the Review a
reputation as the chief forum in

China

for open debate and

free exchange of information.6
Under J.B. Powell's stewardship, the Review hammered at
foreign powers to give up their spheres of influence in China.
He called on them to relinquish

their

railway

andmining

rights, and to remove their troops. He saw the United States
as having a special role in modernizing China. He wrote in the
Review in 1921: "In Practical American terms, the Open Door in
China means a first rate anti-trust law for China." He said:
"I have developed a profound confidence in the good common
sense of the Chinese people and in their ability to unify and
develop their country if given half a chance."7
J.B. Powell's open criticism of Japanese militarism in
China seriously endangered him in the late 193 0s. The Japanese
closed the Review's office on Dec. 8, 1941 shortly after they
occupied Shanghai. A few days later, the Japanese put J.B.

6 Hamilton.
Altruism," p.36.

"The Missouri News Monopoly and American

7 The China Weekly Review. Nov. 5, 1921.
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Powell into jail in Shanghai, where he suffered terribly. In
the end, his feet were amputated because of frost-bite. He was
repatriated to the United States in August 194 2 and was taken
to the Columbia University Medical Center in New York where he
remained until May 1945. While in the hospital, he received
considerable help from friends and admirers to help pay his
mounting bills:

$10,000 personally from Chiang Kai-shek,

another $1,000 from the Nationalist government, $3,6 00 from
Chinese newsmen and some $10,000 from American journalists.8
J.B. Powell spent the recuperation period writing and
learning to walk on artificial feet. He planned to return to
China to run the Review, but was never able to make it. In
194 6, he went to Japan to testify at the war crimes trial in
Tokyo, despite his fragile health. He collapsed and died in
1947 after addressing a University of Missouri alumni luncheon
in Washington, D.C. He was a strong supporter of Chiang and
the Nationalists to the last.9
2.

The Review Under John W. Powell

After four years of suspension, The China Weekly Review
finally resumed publication with Powell in charge. The first
issue of the new Review bears the date Oct. 20, 1945. When
Powell and the Review's old staff returned to the paper's
office at 113 Avenue Edward VII

8 Hamilton,
Altruism," p.41.
9 Ibid.

(today's Yenan Road)

in

"The Missouri News Monopoly and American
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Shanghai, they found that the previous Japanese occupants had
thoroughly looted the place. However, the staff members were
extremely happy to be back in Shanghai and doing business at
the same place. The paper stated that it would aim at the same
high standards of journalism and to follow the same basic
principles of truth and accuracy as those established in 1917
by its founders, Thomas Millard and J.B. Powell.10
During the Chinese civil war,

the Review

featured

articles on the internal struggle in China, the developing
Cold War, domestic insurrections in Indochina and Malaya, and
trade

problems.

Powell

began

to

build

the

journal's

circulation and develop a reputation as a journalist by
broadening the paper's scope with articles by Chinese and
American

contributors

and

expressing

criticism

of

the

inefficiency, cruelty, corruption, and press censorship of
Chiang's Nationalist government. He tried to steer a middle
course between the Nationalists and the Communists. In its
editorial on Nov. 24, 1945, Powell wrote:
We feel that the usual answer that the Chinese people
are still not yet organized to handle democracy is just so
much political eye-wash. No one is qualified to say whether
the Chinese people are capable to handle democracy or not
until the Chinese people are given a chance to try it out. We
are inclined to think that both the Kuomintang (Nationalists)
and the Communists are apt to under-estimate the political
maturity of the Chinese people. ... We propose that both
Kuomintang and the Communists take this chance to demonstrate
fully and without further delay that they are prepared to put
their democratic aspiration into actual practice.11

10 The China Weekly Review. Oct. 20, 1945.
11 The China Weekly Review. Nov. 24, 1945.
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In 1947, Powell defied Chiang's censorship and reported
the Nationalists' massacre of about 5,000 people on the island
of Taiwan,

which was torn by revolt on the eve of the

Nationalist occupation. On March 30, 1947, The New York Times
reporter Tillman Durdin wrote: "An American weekly magazine,
The China Weekly Review, today was the first publication in
the country to give a full story of the recent tragic events
in the island. The Review carries a detailed account, written
by John W. Powell, the publisher, who has just returned from
a week's visit to the island."12 After the story came out,
major U.S. newspapers referred to Powell as a "fearless" and
lauded him as "one of the best-informed newspapermen on China
conditions." 13
Powell harshly criticized MacArthur's Japanese policy to
restore to power the conservative political and economic
groups. He also turned his editorial attention to the United
States itself, criticizing the House Un-American Activities
Committee, the affinity of some policy makers and politicians
for

Chiang,

and what he

saw

as the

growing

diplomatic

intransigence of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, the paper regularly carried ads for the National

12 The New York Times. March 30, 1947.
13 Lauren, The China Hands Legacy, p. 29.
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City

Bank,

Pan

American,

Ford

and

other

American

corporations.14
As Chiang's forces retreated and the Chinese Communists
took over Shanghai in 1949, the Review published an optimistic
front-page editorial on May 28. It stated: "This publication
has been a consistent critic of the corruption, exploitation
and ineptitude that has characterized the Nationalist regime,
particularly in the post-war years. We therefore welcome the
change that has come about and hope that the arrival of the
People's Liberation Army will mark the beginning of a new era
in which the people of China can now begin to enjoy the
benefits of good government. The new authorities have an
immense task ahead of them in reconstructing the country and
in reorganizing its social structure. We wish them well and
will endeavor to reflect honestly and fairly the development
of

the

new

China."15 It the

following

issues,

it

also

published laudatory reports of conditions in the Communistheld regions. Associate editor Julian Schuman ventured 120
miles from Shanghai to report that Communist rule was pleasant
and

efficient

in

contrast

to

the

harshness

of

the

Nationalists.
A year earlier, however, the Review had editorially
disparaged Communist claims that the United States was spying
14 Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition. Justice
and Injustice in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) ,
p. 219.
15 The China Weekly Review. May 28, 1949.
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in their territory. In its Nov. 20, 1948 editorial, the Review
said: "... The claims of the Communists to the effect that the
US is establishing a spy net in Asia equipped with radio
locators,

etc. becomes a bit ridiculous.

For a realistic

outfit, such statements seem even more out of place. If the
Chinese Communists really believe this story, they appear more
gullible than we had imagined them to be.

If they don't

believe it and are using the story purely for propaganda
purposes, which seems to us more than likely, they are toying
with the truth, which is something impossible to justify."16
After Shanghai was taken over by the Communist troops,
the subscriptions of the Review went down significantly from
their peak

of about 10,000 and advertising revenue also went

down dramatically. With economic difficulties and most parts
of the country under the control of the new regime, Powell
thought about closing the paper. However, encouraged by many
Chinese and American friends and readers who wanted to get
reliable news about China, Powell decided to continue. Most of
the American subscribers were former China missionaries,
businessmen interested in China, and universities across the
United States.
Powell's

criticism of Chiang's Nationalists

and his

sympathy for the Communist government did not go unnoticed in
Washington. In September 1949, U.S. Passport Office Chief Ruth
Shipley refused

to renew Powell's passport,

16 The China Weekly Rev i e w . Nov. 20, 1948.
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Powell's publication was pro-Chinese Communist. The passport
official also labeled Powell's wife, Sylvia,

a "Communist

Propagandist" after she praised the "new order" in Shanghai
and criticized in a Portland newspaper American support for
Chiang's Nationalist party.17
Other U.S. officials also expressed disapproval of the
Powells. The American Consulate in Shanghai complained in 1949
that the Powells were among a group of Americans who tended to
lean away from the principles of U.S. government policy and
had

caused

complained

considerable
that

trouble.

Powell's

The

editorials

various

and

reports

articles

were

decidedly "Pink."18
By 1950, Shanghai had a total of four foreign-owned
publications, down from
of

seven before 194 9. The only

closures

foreign publications were due to poor business. In July,

limited circulation and the loss in revenues prompted Powell
again to consider closing the Review. But a few weeks later,
he dropped the idea, deciding instead to change the magazine
to a monthly called The China Monthly Review. With the Korean
War going on, Powell considered it necessary to preserve the
magazine

as

a

forum

to

challenge

the

United

States'

"adventuristic policy" in Korea.19
Powell

subsidized

the

journal

with

operating

17 Kutler, The American Inquisition, pp. 219-221.
18 Ibid. , p. 220.
19 The China Weekly

Review. August 5, 1950.
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translation service and putting out two other publications.
Every day, the Review would put together a ten-to-twelve-page
translation of China's economic regulations and items of trade
and commercial interest, and distribute it to the foreign
business community in Shanghai. At the end of each month,
Powell published a "Monthly Report" on the situation in China
and an economic magazine, which turned out to be short-lived.
He sold them to the head offices of large foreign firms.
Another book periodically published by the Review was Who's
Who in China. These efforts proved quite profitable and helped
finance the Review's whole operation.
The Review was printed by Millingtons, a British-owned
press in China; Powell bought his own newsprint on the open
market. Foreign distribution was handled through the mail to
places such the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada,
India and Southeast Asia. The Review was also available on
newsstands in China. Powell did not handle distribution, but
instead concentrated on editorial tasks. A typical day for him
was checking local press for news leads, sending staff to
cover events and writing the editorial. Sometimes he would
travel, covering important events himself.20
The

revamped

Review

reflected

the

concerns

of

revolutionary China. Articles described the building of new
sewer lines in Shanghai, tax reform, the abolition of labor

20 The China Weekly Review. August 5, 1950, and Powell
interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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corruption, government assumption of YMCA activities, and the
new relationships between foreigners and Chinese. Most of the
articles were written by the Review's editors, correspondents
and independent contributors. It routinely used foreign and
Chinese sources such as The New York Times. Time, the British
news agency Reuters,

the New China News Agency,

and two

Chinese newspapers, The Ta Kuncr Pao and The Wen Wei Pao.
Opinions from the Chinese press went under the column titled
"Chinese Press Opinion." Sometimes the Review would carry full
texts of speeches made by Chinese leaders such as Liu Shaochi, Chen Yun, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others.
When the Review was criticized by Walter Simmons, then
the

Chicago

Tribune's Tokyo

correspondent,

for

being

a

Communist publication, Powell counterattacked by saying that
the smearing had been a desire to cash in on the then-popular
anti-red

hysteria

in

America,

an

attempt

to

grab

the

headlines. He said that, because of the Review's "accurate and
objective" reporting, new subscriptions from out of China had
increased substantially.21
Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950,
and especially after the Chinese intervention in November, the
Review offered strident attacks on the American conduct of the
war and its policy toward the People's Republic of China. It
was

this

reporting

of the Korean war,

specifically his

allegations concerning the use of germ warfare on the part of
21 The China Weekly R e v i e w . March 25, 1950.
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the U.S. armies, that got Powell into his most serious trouble
with the U.S. government. The trouble culminated in a sedition
charge brought against him after he and his wife, Sylvia,
returned to the United States in August 1953.

Chapter Four.

The Review's Coverage of the Korean War

When the Korean War broke out

in 1950,

the Review

criticized U.S. involvement. Its editorials charged that the
UN sanction supporting intervention was unjustly adopted,
because the U.S. government used its economic powers to sway
the votes and because large countries like China and India
were not fully represented in the UN. It published stories and
photos of American POWs in North Korea, purportedly protesting
the war. The Review also printed lists of alleged violations
of

the

Korean-Chinese

border

by

U.S.

aircraft.

Powell

contended that the conflict was a Korean civil war, and that
any extension of it would be criminal, as it would only bring
more suffering and destruction to more people, including the
American troops. After the Chinese troops joined North Korea
in the war, Powell criticized the U.S. policy of bringing
economic sanctions against China.
The Review's January 1951 issue charged that U.S. planes
had

carried

out

"systematic

bombing,

strafing

and

reconnaissance flights over China's northeastern provinces."1
Then,

in February,

Powell quoted The Chicago Daily News.

Newsweek. The Christian Science Monitor. The Nippon Times, and
Guancfmincr Daily to report that the United States was using
Japanese troops in Korea. The Review also used The London
Times. Reuters,

The London Daily Mirror, and the British

magazine Picture Post in reporting the atrocities allegedly
1 The China Monthly Review. January 1951.
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committed by the regime of South Korea's Syngman Rhee. In the
editorial titled "Rearming of Japan," Powell said:
The Truman administration has cast all pretenses to the
winds and is now openly rearming Japan, in spite of the fact
that Japan is technically still an enemy nation and is
governed by military occupation and in spite of the fact that
this is a complete violation of all Allied wartime and postwar
agreements governing J apa n . ... The old Japanese thought police
have been restored, while freedom of the press is n o n 
existent. More than 1,000 progressive publications have been
suppressed by the reactionary Yoshida regime acting on the
orders of MacArthur2

Meanwhile, the Review reported on the low morale of the
American troops. It said:
Despite the tight censorship and the cooperation of most
correspondents, reports of the low morale of US troops slip
through in occasional letters and press dispatches.
For
example, a press agency dispatch from New York on March 23
reported that The Chicago Daily News correspondents in Korea
as saying that nothing would boost the morale of the troops
"more than evacuation home." Soldiers, the correspondent
added, "see but one way home— on stretchers."3

After General MacArthur was dismissed on April 1951,
Powell used figures from Hsinhua, the New China News Agency,
and Reuters to report that the UN forces had suffered heavy
losses in Korea. However, he also reported the U.S. Defense
Department's own U.S. casualty figure.4
Starting in June 1951, the Review began its features on
POWS, using the New China News Agency as the main source.
Excerpts of Peking Radio (now Radio Beijing) broadcasts made

2 The China Monthly Review, April 1951.
3 Ibid.
4 The China Monthly Review. May and June, 1951.

39

by POWs to their American families were reprinted. Photos of
happy, well-fed and well-clothed U.S. POWs were published to
counter the "officially-inspired reports in the American press
that U.S. prisoners are being mistreated by their Korean and
Chinese captors."5 This contrasted with the Review's reports
that American captors maltreated Chinese and Korean POWs and
tattooed their bodies with anti-Communist slogans. It carried
names, serial numbers, ranks, units or addresses of U.S. POWs
to notify relatives. Meanwhile, the magazine made clear that
the names of the POWs were not official, but were compiled by
the Review's own editors from the New China News Agency
dispatches and local newspapers. It also noted that many of
the

prisoners

had

given

their

names

and

messages

to

corespondents of the New China News Agency during interviews
so that their families at home might know they were safe.6
After the cease-fire talk started in July 1951 between
the warring parties, the Review continued to criticize the
U.S. government, charging the United States with stalling the
negotiations and the exchange of POW lists. In August, after
U.S. forces launched an offensive against the Chinese and the
North Koreans,

the Review commented that the action had

backfired and was designed to prolong the Korean war. While
censorship kept most of the Western press silent on the
offensive, the Review used the New China News Agency figures
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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to allege that the United States lost nearly 20,000 soldiers
in less than a month.
The coverage of the Korean War took a dramatic turn in
early 19 52 when North Korea and China charged that the United
States was engaged in germ warfare against their troops and
civilians. In February 1952, North Korean Foreign Minister Bak
Hun Yung protested to the United Nations about the use of
bacteriological weapons on the part of the U.S. forces in
Korea. The China Monthly Review's editorial responded harshly,
saying that the American invaders, "proceeding in a vein which
surpassed the savagery of Hitler Germany and Hirohito Japan in
the last war, by a systematic spreading of smallpox, cholera
and plague germs over North Korea," have committed a "crime
against humanity." The same editorial, citing Newsweek and
North

Korean

officials,

traced

the

record

of

American

preparation and use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. The
editorial concluded that the use of germ warfare was a trick
by

the

Americans

to

obstruct

the

truce

talks

and

to

indiscriminately annihilate the Korean and Chinese people.
Based on the report by the North Korean foreign minister, the
Review recounted alleged instances of U.S. forces spreading
large guantities of bacteria-carrying insects by planes over
North Korea and the Chinese front-line positions.7
The Review also charged that the Americans had used

7 The

1952 .

China

Monthly

Revi e w . November

1951,

and

March
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prisoners

of

war

for

experimental

purposes

and

had

collaborated with Japanese bacteriological war criminals, who,
through U.S. pressure, had been freed in 1950 of charges of
conducting such warfare in China during World War II. "The
true face of American imperialism has once more been bared,"
it said. " The men who are carrying out Wall Street's war in
Korea are using the savage methods practiced by the
and

Japanese

criminals

in

the

last

war.

German

Like

their

predecessors, they will be held accountable for their crimes
against peace and humanity." 8
In April 1952, the Review reported the United States had
extended its bacteriological warfare from Korea to China.
Pictures, ostensibly of U.S. germ bombs, and of bacteriacarrying insects and flies dropped in China occupied several
pages. It reported an announcement by Chinese Foreign Minister
Chou En-lai that germ-laden insects had been released by U.S.
planes over Northeast China. It quoted Chou En-lai as stating
that

American

aviators

who

flew

over

China

and

used

bacteriological weapons would, on capture, be dealt with as
war criminals. The Review therefore commented:
Actually there is no way for (Secretary of State Dean)
Acheson or the US government to evade responsibility for this
attempt at wholesale extermination of civilians. The evidence
gathered in Korea and China is overwhelming. The plain fact of
the matter is that Washington, stopped short in its aggression
in Korea and compelled to sit down and talk cease-fire terms,
has now shown its real countenance to the whole world. This
criminal action is the product of men bereft of their sanity

8 The China Monthly Revi e w . March 1952.
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and is the sequel to the no less horrible crimes carried out
by the Nazis. The use of germ warfare is a clear-cut violation
of international law— specifically of the Geneva Convention of
June 17, 1 9 5 2
It is already late but there is still time
for the American people to put a stop to these crimes against
humanity which are being committed in their name. And there is
still time for the individual soldier to make that 'moral
choice' which the Allies so recently declared to be his
personal responsibility.9

In the following months, germ warfare became an important
subject

and

America's

the Review carried a series ofarticlesdetailing

research

in

bacteriological

weapons.

American

sources included the New York Journal-American. Life. The New
York Times. Newsweek, Science Illustrated, Saturday Evening
Post,

Atlantic Monthly. Reader's

Digest, and

some books

published in America. Also used were the New China News Agency
and

the Central News Agency of Korea.10
In

May

1952, the Review reported thatthe U.S. engagement

in germ warfare had been fully proved by a group of lawyers,
journalists, and doctors who visited areas where U.S. planes
had allegedly dropped infected insects.

Specifically, the

group was made of lawyers from Austria,

Belgium,

Brazil,

Britain, China, France, Italy, and Poland; a team of Korean,
Chinese, and foreign correspondents; and Chinese medical and
scientific

workers.

According

to

the

Review.

this

international group had personally examined remains of germ
bombs, infected insects and the material used to spread the
lethal germs.
9 The China Monthly Review. April 1952.
10 The China Monthly. May and June 1952.
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From July 1952 to the magazine's closing a year later in
July 1953, almost every issue of the Review reported that U.S.
POWs had been inoculated against infection in the U.S. Army
and were involved in germ warfare, and that they wanted peace
and an end to war. Names, ranks, and serial numbers of these
POWs were also provided. The Review called these admissions by
U.S. POWs "the final link in the chain of evidence before the
world showing the U.S. government guilty of launching germ
warfare.,,n
As evidence of U.S. germ warfare in Korea and China, the
Review compiled the following international sources which did
on-the-spot investigation to prove the credibility of its
reporting:12
1) A six-man group of journalists from Korea, China and
Hong Kong, London, Paris, Budapest, and Warsaw.
2) A group of well-known jurists from Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Britain, China, France, Italy, and Poland. Five of the
eight-man group were non-Communists.
3) A group of Chinese medical and scientific workers
which

included

Dr.

Mei

Ju-ao,

China's

member

of

the

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which tried
major Japanese war criminals after VJ day.
4) Dr. James Endicott, a Canadian missionary in China for

11 The China Monthly Review. July 1952.
12 The China Monthly Review. October 1952.
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20 years. He visited China in spring 1952 and investigated
areas purportedly affected by germ warfare.
5) Dr. Hewlett Johnson, England's Dean of Canterbury. He
spent 40 days in China summer 1952 and inspected the evidence
of germ warfare and interviewed Chinese Christian leaders who
also investigated the charges.
6)

The

International

Scientific

Commission

for

Investigation of the Facts concerning Bacteriological Warfare
in Korea and China, which, after more than two months of
investigation, concluded that the peoples of Korea and China
has indeed been the targets of U.S. bacteriological weapons.
7) Numerous captured U.S. POWs admitted dropping germ
laden bombs over Korea and POWs testifying the spreading of
germ warfare against U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.
The International Scientific Commission included such
well-know scientists as Dr.

Joseph Needham,

a Cambridge

University bio-chemist and embryologist at that time. The
commission

put

together

a

300,000-word

report

with

following conclusion:
The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the
objectives
of bacteriological weapons.
These
have
been
employed by units of the USA armed forces, using a great
variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which
seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army
during the second world war.
The Commission reached these conclusions, passing from
one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its
members had not been disposed to believe that such an inhuman
technique could have been put into execution in the face its
universal condemnation by the peoples of the nations.13

13 The China Monthly Rev i e w . Nov.-Dec.

1952.
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Besides covering the Korea War, the Review continued to
report the domestic situation in China. Most of its editorials
commented on the progress and success of the new republic.
Headlines

included

"Food

Problem

Solved,"

"Production

Miracle," "Victory on the Economic Front," "Peasants' Taxes
Lowered," "Victory Over Famine," and "Science in New China."
The American media published the germ-warfare charges
made by China and Korea, but readily dismissed them as typical
Communist propaganda. Newsweek characterized the charges as "a
world wide epidemic of Red propaganda," and it quoted U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson as saying that the charges
reflected "the inability of the Communists to care for the
health of the people."14

Newsweek also listed four reasons

for the Communist propaganda:

(1) to distract their people

from some major concessions they were going to make
Panmunjom.

at

(2) to build up a highly emotional pretext for

breaking off the truce talks, and to rally their war-weary
peoples.

(3) to frighten their peoples into taking proper

health precautions against the epidemics then prevalent in
China and Korea.15 As for Dr. James Endicott,

a Canadian

missionary to China, who was reported to have found evidence
of America being involved in germ warfare, Newsweek countered
that he was Canada's best-known apologist for Russia and was

14 Newsweek. March 17, 1952, p. 43.
15 Newsweek. April 7, 1952, p. 40.
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invited to China just to spout the germ-warfare propaganda.16
After the International Scientific Commission for the
Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in
Korea

and

China publicized

its report,

Time

called

the

contents ridiculous and unscientific, and reported that the
scientists all had strong pro-Communist leanings. The magazine
quoted U.S. officials as saying that the germ-warfare charges
were a "monstrous and incredible Big Lie."17 Time reported
that the International Scientific Commission conducted no
scientific tests and it also discredited the testimony of Dean
Hewlett Johnson with regard to the germ warfare and called him
"the Red Dean."18
The New York Times labeled the charges as propaganda too.
Before publishing germ warfare photos of People's Daily of
China,

The New York Times asked military and scientific

experts to verify their truthfulness. The experts concluded
that the deadly bugs in the pictures were harmless insects
incapable of carrying diseases; photos of bacteria were either
fakes, photos of innocuous bacteria or meaningless blotches;
and the "germ bomb" supposedly dropped by the United States
was a picture of a nonexplosive bomb used to distribute

16 Newsweek. May 12, 1952, p. 54.
17 Time. May 19, 1952, pp. 23-24.
18 Time. May 25, 1952, p. 54; and July 21, 1952, p. 22.
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propaganda leaflets.19

19 The New York Times. April 1, 1953.

Chapter Five. The Sedition Trial of John William Powell

During its eight years of publication after World War II,
the Review suffered economic problems.

In June 1953,

the

Powells decided that they could no longer absorb the journal's
increasingly
Nationalist

heavy

losses.

Powell

blockade of the China

complained
coast,

the

that
U.S.

the
post

office's periodic interference with the mail between China and
America, Washington's trade embargo upon China and the open
prohibition of the Review in some countries had forced its
closure. Nevertheless, Powell expressed satisfaction that his
magazine had survived as long as it did, and that it had
served its readers well. He said that the Review had made a
"worthwhile contribution in presenting the facts about the new
China, in telling the exciting and important story of the new
civilization" sprouting in the new land.1
In the Review's farewell issue in July 1953, Powell wrote
that China had made more progress in the past four years than
ever before, and that the Chinese people had taken their
destiny into their own hands. The Powells and their two sons
left Shanghai for the United States in August 1953.
Washington was aware of the return of the Powells to the
United States. The State Department, CIA, and FBI had kept
track of Powell's movements, including his visits to friends
in the United States. A CIA agent in Hong Kong warned his
1 The China Monthly Review. June 1953.
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superiors that Powell could become an effective propagandist
for the Chinese regime in view of his "superficial, plausible
way of putting things."2

Upon yhr Powells'

Customs Service Office held the luggage,

return,

the

including nearly

2,000 books from the Review library, because the library
contained publications and films of a "political nature," and
because they had physically been to Communist China. Actually,
the majority of the books were published in the United States
and Britain.

They included the New Testament and Thomas

Hardy's Jude The Obscure. Finally, Powell had to hire a lawyer
and managed to get the books released in 1961, eight years
after their arrival in the United States, on the condition
that he paid the storage fees.3
After he returned, Powell, not fully aware of the extent
of the anti-Communist hysteria developing in his home country,
continued to praise the improved living conditions in China.
In an interview with the Portland Oregonian. Powell said the
average Chinese was better off under the Communists than under
the Nationalists. He said that America's policy of isolating
China had not worked and that other countries such as Britain
and France had benefitted much from increased trade with
China. Powell also said his observations of conditions were
not limited to the narrow confines of Shanghai and that he and

2 Kutler, The American Inquisition, p. 223.
3 "A Journalist's Retrospective," by John W. Powell in
The China Hands Legacy, pp. 147-148.
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his wife, Sylvia, had travelled fairly widely in China.4
The FBI thought Powell's statements warranted prosecution
and asked the Justice Department to take immediate action.
Officials with the Justice Department's Criminal Division
agreed that Powell's writings were "replete with half truths,
distortions, and shadings of truth" and even absurdities. But
they found that Powell's statements offered no basis for
prosecution because it was impossible to demonstrate their
falsity.

The FBI's efforts to verify the truthfulness of

Powell's statements about U.S. germ warfare operations were
repeatedly rebuffed by various government agencies on grounds
of confidentiality.5
Finally, in September 1954, thirteen months after he had
returned home, Powell was summoned to Washington, D.C., to
testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
chaired by Indiana Republican Senator William Jenner. Sen.
Jenner said the subcommittee believed that certain American
individuals had conspired to propagandize the American public
on behalf of the "brainwashing, soul-killing Red Chinese."
These Americans, according to Sen. Jenner, included John K.
Fairbank, John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, who
"formed a little cluster in Shanghai around a once "honorable
publication, The China Weekly, and later Monthly Review." Sen.

4 The Oregonian. Sept. 30, 1953.
5 Kutler, The American Inquisition, pp. 222-225.

51

Jenner called the Review an instrument by which the group
"advertized and

brazenly proclaimed devotion" to China.6

The subcommittee's hearings began with witnesses who had
allegedly been adversely affected by the Review. Former POWs
of the Korean War testified that they had been terribly
maltreated in the hands of the Chinese and North Koreans, and
that The China Monthly Review was one of the pro-Communist
publications
compulsory

used

by

their

ideological

captors

for

indoctrination.

propaganda

and

Other publications

included The Shanghai News, The New York Daily Worker. The
London Daily Worker, People's World. Masses and Main Stream.
Political Affairs. The National Guardian, and dozens of other
Chinese and Russian magazines and books. According to the
witnesses, although the prisoners' camps were often short of
food and medicine, truckloads of The China Monthly Review
always arrived on time. Prisoners were forced to spend an
average of six to eight hours every day studying articles in
the Review and that failure to endorse its line had resulted
in

a

number

of

severe

punishments

and

even

deaths

of

prisoners.
A prominent case was one involving Mrs. Dolores Gill,
whose husband,
Chinese

and

Lt.

Charles L. Gill, was captured by the

later died

in the prison

camps.

Mrs.

Gill

6 Hearings, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, 83rd Congress, Second Session.
(September 27, 1954), pp. 1819-1822.
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testified that Powell had written her in January 1951, telling
her that it was the policy of the Chinese to treat all
prisoners with "greatest leniency and fairness."7 However,
after the Korean War, Mrs. Gill learned from her husband's
fellow prisoners

that

Lt.

Charles

L.

Gill

had

died

of

malnutrition and dysentery.
When it was Powell's turn to testify, he freely
answered questions about his father, J.B. Powell, and his own
education and employment with the U.S. government. He admitted
that as editor of the Review, he was fully responsible for the
contents of the magazine. However, when he was asked about his
associations, his writings, his belief and the other Americans
whose names appeared in the magazine, he routinely refused to
answer,

invoking the First Amendment's

guarantee

of the

freedom of expression or the Fifth Amendment's provisions
protecting against self-incrimination.8
After the hearing, Powell held a press conference at the
National Press Club in Washington, D.C. He said: "I am not a
Communist, not now and never have been."

He added that the

Review "was not considered pro-Communist by the Communists in
China." When he was questioned about the germ warfare charges,
he answered: "Something must have happened there. Something

7 Ibid., p. 1832.
8
Hearings,
Subcommittee
to
Investigate
the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Security
Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83rd Congress, Second
Session. (September 27, 1954), pp. 1818-1912.
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sure as heck must have happened up there.” He also said that
he saw no "evidence” of Americans dying of torture in Korean
prison camps.9
Powell's press conference upset the subcommittee, and
Sen. Jenner called Powell "this renegade American,” who he
said indirectly helped to torture American servicemen. Sen.
Jenner charged that Powell was travelling

freely in the

country to spread the poison of confusion and defeatism. "It
is reasonable to believe that John W. Powell is in this
country to soften up the American people, as he tried to
soften up our fighting men, so we will agree to trade with the
Soviet bloc, and keep quiet if Red China is admitted to the
United Nations,” he said. Meanwhile, Sen. Jenner announced
that he would submit the hearing transcripts to the Department
of Justice and ask the Attorney General of the United States
to immediately press treason charges against Powell.10
The
Francisco,

Senate

hearings

continued

in

December

in

San

where the Powells maintained their residence.

However, when Sen. Herman Welker (R-Idaho) of the subcommittee
called Powell as the first witness, the editor decided not to
appear, even though he technically was still under subpoena.
Instead, he went to stay with a friend in San Francisco while

9 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, 83rd Congress, Second Session.
(January 3, 1955), pp. 64-66.
10 Hearing, p. 2018.
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the subcommittee was in the same city. He said he was tired of
the hearings and same witnesses, and that be believed the
subcommittee moved the hearings to San Francisco in order to
embarrass him publicly and to make life difficult for him and
his family.11
His wife, Sylvia, was then called to testify. A native of
Oregon and graduate of Reed College in Portland, Sylvia had
worked as an administrative assistant for the United Nations
Relief

and

Rehabilitation

Administration

(UNRRA)

in

Washington, D.C., and later in Shanghai, China in 1945 and
1946. After her marriage to Powell in 1947, she became a
contributor and later associate editor of the Review. After
supplying the committee with her personal history,

Sylvia

refused to answer questions about her role at The China
Monthly Review or about her husband's whereabouts. She took
her constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment and
declined even to acknowledge the name of her husband.
Ex-POWs testified that, contrary to Powell's reports,
they had been brutally treated in prison camps, and that the
peace appeal signed by prisoners was the result of forced
indoctrination under conditions of duress. Mrs. Gill, widow of
Lt.

Gill,

again

recounted her

agony over her husband's

imprisonment. One of the witnesses said he was with Lt. Gill
and that Lt. Gill was starving and suffering from dysentery
when Mrs. Gill got the letter from Powell.
11 Powell interview, March 19-23,

1993.
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After

the

hearings,

the

subcommittee

came

to

the

following conclusions: (1) Powell was in a position to know
the falsity of much of the material he published about the
American government and American soldiers at war.

(2) His

magazine was used extensively by the Chinese Communists to
brainwash American POWs under inhuman conditions.

(3) The

Review was both controlled and supported by the Chinese
government.

(4) Powell had defied a subpoena of the U.S.

Senate. Sen. Welker accused Powell of hiding from justice, and
the subcommittee reiterated its pledge to press for a treason
prosecution against him.12
The San Francisco hearing cost the Powells dearly. An
hour and a half after Sylvia testified and revealed that she
had been working for the National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis, she was fired. The foundation explained that Mrs.
Sylvia

Powell

was

an

embarrassment

to

the

national

philanthropic organization, to its many volunteers and to its
staff workers.13
After the subcommittee returned to Washington,

D.C.,

Powell appeared at a China policy forum in Palo Alto. Asked
about the germ warfare reporting in the Review. Powell said he
saw evidence of germ warfare collected in Korea. He said he
saw evidence just outside the town he lived in and that
plague, cholera, and smallpox suddenly erupted in areas where
12 Hearings. p. 70; pp. 2161-2276.
13 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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such diseases had been completely wiped out.14
On April 25, 1956, Powell, his wife and the Review's
associate editor Julian Schuman were indicted for sedition
under Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
Schuman had returned to the United States at the end of 1953.
A federal grand jury in San Francisco returned a total of
thirteen counts of sedition against them.

The indictment

charged that Powell had published in his magazine statements,
knowing them to be false, and with the intent of interfering
with U.S. forces and to aid their enemies. These included
assertions that:

(a)

U.S. forces in Korea were engaged in

aggressive acts; (b) the United States

used Koreaas a testing

ground for gas weapons and germ warfare;

(c) United States

casualties were of a certain number (higher than official
figures); and (d) U.S. negotiators deliberately stalled and
sabotaged the Korean truce talks. The indictment was that the
Review

published

statements

intended

to

"cause

insubordination, disloyalty and mutiny" among U.S. soldiers
and to obstruct recruiting and enlistment. These included
criticism of the government of the United States and of Chiang
Kai-shek, criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, defense of the
government of China and North Korea, and the statement that
the North Koreans were merely defending their homelands.15
Julian Schuman was the Review's associate editor in
14 Report of the

Senate Judiciary Committee, pp. 68-69.

15 Report of the

Senate Judiciary Committee, pp. 66-67.
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Shanghai from spring 1950 until its closing. He was born in
Boston in 1920, and had studied Chinese at Harvard and Yale
through the Army's language training program. He worked as an
army cryptanalyst until the end of 1947 when he decided to go
to China on his own. While in China, he first landed a job
with the China Press. He did freelance writing

for the

American Broadcasting Company, the Chicago Sun-Times. and the
Denver Post before taking his job at The China Monthly Review.
When Schuman returned to the United States from China at
the end of 1953, he also found himself, like the Powells, to
be unpopular with the government. He was called in March 1956
to

testify

before

the

Senate

Subcommittee

on

Internal

Security. The subcommittee provided a long list of the places
he visited in the United States and pro-China articles he
wrote from China. At the hearing, he answered most of the
questions about his education and employment record,

but

frequently refused to discuss his writings and his affiliation
by invoking his constitutional rights.16
To prove their innocence, Powell and his co-defendants
had several choices. They could demonstrate the absence of
evil intent or that their reporting had presented no "clear or
present

danger"

to

national

interest;

or

they

could

demonstrate the truth of the their statements. The defendants
pleaded not guilty

in September 1956, and chose the second

16 Hearings. Internal Security Subcommittee,
Congress, 2nd Session (March 21, 1956,) pp. 515-549.

84th
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option. As the U.S. government was sensitive to the germ
warfare accusation and the subject was related to classified
documents which the government controlled,

the defendants

maintained that they were forced too obtain evidence from the
People's Republic of China. However, the United States did not
diplomatically recognize China and North Korea, and the State
Department would not issue passports valid for travel to the
two countries. After repeated requests to the court,

the

defendants' lawyers were permitted to travel to China, where
they could take depositions. But, the U.S. government objected
to the taking of depositions in Peking on the ground that
government counsel would not have official access to the
Chinese

mainland

inasmuch as the United

States

did

not

recognize the People's Republic of China.
Federal Judge Louis Goodman finally ordered that the
depositions be taken in the British colony of Hong Kong. In
December 1956, Powell's lawyers moved for an extension of the
time fixed for the taking of depositions in Hong Kong and they
advised the court that the Chinese witnesses were unwilling to
travel to Hong Kong. One of the defendants' lawyers, A. L.
Wirin,

would have to travel to China to persuade those

witnesses to go to Hong Kong. Wirin stated that the Chinese
government would grant him a visa without requiring him to
present a valid U.S. passport. However, about a month later,
the Chinese government reversed itself and, in March 1957,
Judge Goodman stated that he had no jurisdiction to order the
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State Department to validate Wirin's passport for travel to
China. Five months later, Wirin requested an order asking the
Chinese government to provide judicial assistance as to the
prospective witnesses' availability to give their depositions
at some particular time and place. The Ministry of Justice of
China replied that such request would not be honored, because
there was no agreement between the two governments concerning
judicial assistance. Finally, Wirin filed for a dismissal of
the indictment,

arguing that the government's refusal to

validate his passport for travel to China and North Korea
deprived the defendants' of an adequate opportunity to prepare
for their defense.
Without questioning the U.S. foreign policy toward China
and North Korea, Judge Goodman was concerned with whether the
defendants were deprived of their constitutional rights of due
process and of fair trial by the acts of the United States,
which prevented their counsel from gathering evidence for
their defense. He agreed that the evidence necessary for their
defense was in China and North Korea; and without giving the
defendants the opportunity to gather evidence, the rights
granted by the Constitution would become meaningless. He was
impressed

with

Wirin's

list

of

more

than

one

hundred

prospective witnesses who could offer evidence to counter the
charges that the defendants had falsely characterized the
American war effort, truce negotiations, war casualties, and
the use of germ warfare.

"So the United States has

its
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choice," Judge Goodman stated. "It can choose to adhere to its
policy of non-issuance of such passports. Or it can decide
that it is more important to prosecute this criminal case. If
the former be its choice, it will mean a discontinuance of the
present prosecution.1,17
Three weeks

later,

the State Department reluctantly

agreed to issue Wirin a passport for China and North Korea,
believing that it was more important to try the Powell case
than to maintain passport purity with China. Wirin entered
China on January 7, 1958, and left at the end

of February.

While in China, Wirin talked to about fifty witnesses who said
they saw American planes dropped containers of insects over
Chinese towns and villagers and could testify that the insects
carried germs. But the witnesses would not appear at a trial
unless the United States and China had a judicial agreement.
Just before the scheduled opening of the trial on July 14,
1958, Wirin moved for dismissal of the indictment on the
grounds that the witnesses could not appear because of the
hostility between the two nations. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused

to issuea writ of

mandamus

directing a

dismissal.
As part of the defense,
various

federal

Powell's lawyers subpoenaed

departments and congressional committees,

directing for the release of documents related to American
aggression,

germ warfare,

and the

conduct

of

the

truce

17 United States v. Powell. 156 F. Supp. 526-535 (1957).
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negotiations. Officials soon became worried that classified
records would have to be brought to the court and the trial
could have propaganda value for unfriendly nations. Assistant
U.S.

Attorney James B.

Schnake told the court that the

government would not offer any evidence on these issues and
said that the defense demand would threaten military security.
Defense lawyer Doris Walker responded that she would not allow
the government to define the boundary of proof

for the

defense.
Finally,

after several postponements,

Judge Goodman

ordered the trial set for January 26, 1959. During the trial,
the government offered the testimony of Private Page Baylor,
a former POW in Korea, to show the distribution of The China
Monthly Review, among the POWs and to show the effect the
Review's articles had upon them. The court agreed with the
defense objection that the testimony was inadmissible because
a provision of the sedition laws limits its application to the
United States and its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and
ordered the argument on the objection to be held in the
absence of the jury.18
During the objection argument, Schnake stated that in his
opinion,

the evidence in question had established actual

18 Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code says
that activities affecting armed forces during war shall be
punished and it shall apply within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States, and on the high seas, as
well within the United States. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Sta.811.)
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treason on the part of the defendants. Judge Goodman also
stated that the evidence presented so far would be "prima
facie sufficient" (enough at first glance) to prove treason
since

treason

law

did

not

have

the

same

jurisdiction

limitations as sedition law. Reporters, after checking the
official court transcript to insure accuracy,

quoted the

judge's comments. Some newspaper headlines stated that the
judge declared "the Powells guilty of treason," and that "the
judge had flayed the Powells." The next day, the defense
lawyer, Doris Walker, tendered a motion for mistrial on the
ground that the newspapers in the San Francisco area had
published inflammatory articles and headlines indicating that
the trial judge had declared the defendants guilty of treason.

Judge Goodman agreed to the motion for a mistrial on the
ground of prejudicial publicity. He explained he had made the
remarks about treason in response to prosecution arguments and
during the absence of the jury, and criticized the media for
thwarting the just administration of justice.19
However, the government immediately filed a new complaint
of treason against the defendants and asked that they be held
without

bail.

Defense

counsels

called

the new

charge

a

"miserable, filthy trick" and "dirty pool."20 Defense attorney
Charles Garry argued that there had been no prima facie
19 United States v. Powell. 171 F. Supp. 203-205.
20 San Francisco Chronicle. Jan. 31, 1959.
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showing of treason and that the government had not offered two
witnesses to any overt act of treason. The court agreed again.
The Justice Department never was able to offer witnesses for
the treason charges;

and in the end, when

it sought to

continue the treason charge again in July 1959, the U.S.
Commissioner

in

San

Francisco

denied

and

dismissed

the

complaint.
Finally,

in 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

ordered the sedition indictment dismissed and closed the
investigation, saying that because of the existing conditions
in mainland China, direct testimony of two witnesses to an
overt act of treason could not be obtained.21

21 Report of the Attorney General, (1962), p. 257.

Chapter Six. The Conclusion

The sedition law had been in existence

long before

Powell's indictment. The first sedition law of the United
States, the Alien and Sedition Acts, was passed by Congress in
1797

for

the

purpose

of

punishing

opposition

to

the

government. It was in fact aimed at editors who published or
uttered false,

scandalous and malicious criticism of the

President, Congress, or others in government with the intent
to defame them or bring them into disrepute. However, the law
was short-lived and died in 1801 after Thomas Jefferson became
president of the United States.
Later on, wartime emergencies in the Civil War and World
War I brought new sedition statutes. The Espionage Act of 1917
and its amendments in 1918 made it unlawful for anybody to
speak or publish anything with the intention of causing
contempt, scorn, or disrepute of the form of government, the
Constitution, the flag or the military cause of the United
States. In the famous case of Schenck v. U.S., Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes enunciated the "clear and present danger test."
He wrote: "When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their

utterance

will

not

be

endured."1 The

test

was

subsequently invoked in various cases, and was used to warrant
government's prosecution of dissent. The sedition law was
enlarged and updated several times, and was finally labeled
1 Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code in 1948.2
Although the sedition charges against Powell and his co
defendants were dropped, the Powells and Schuman paid a high
price. To meet their $40,000 legal bills, they had to borrow
money from relatives and friends, and raised funds on their
own. During the trial, the Powells had to send their children
off to stay with friends and relatives. Sylvia lost her job.
Powell, who was selling school supplies, had just received a
big order from a community across the bay when the story of
the trial hit the area newspapers. The order and the job were
canceled. Even Powell's auto insurance company attempted to
drop his coverage because of the fear that somebody might
damage his car.
Still, many people supported the Powells. The American
Civil

Liberties

Union

(ACLU)

stepped

in

to

oppose

the

prosecution, claiming it constituted a serious threat to the
press freedom guaranteed under the First Amendment. At the
children's center where their two boys were being cared for,
the teachers took every precaution to protect the children
from any adverse publicity. Powell also recalled that when he
took his Volkswagen to be serviced, the garage owner said he
had read about their case in the paper and suggested that
Powell bring the car in regularly, regardless of whether he
had the money to pay for the service.
2 Harold L. Nelson and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. , Law of Mass
Communication (New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1982),
pp. 35-45.
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While the trial was still going on, an artist friend
suggested that they fix and enlarge their tiny house. Powell,
who had read some books on carpentry, added another room to
the house and sold the expanded house.

Soon the Powells

started their own business, buying old houses, fixing them and
then selling them. From this, they branched into the buying
and selling of antiques. They ran an antique shop on Church
Street in San Francisco until their retirement a few years
ago. Their oldest son, John, took over the business.
Julian Schuman went back to China in 1964 to work as a
English

language expert for a foreign language press

in

Beijing and in 1981 helped China launch its first English
language newspaper, China Daily. He continues to work for that
paper today.3
The Powells do not regret what they wrote in the Review
forty years ago. They remain as convinced as they were in the
1950s that the United States had been engaged in germ warfare
against the North Koreans and the Chinese. Although he had not
personally talked to any victims of the alleged germ warfare,
Powell had regularly interviewed Chinese and foreign friends
who had been to areas affected by air-dropped germs. "This is
not a rehearsed story," Powell said. "If they (the Chinese)
want to fake something, you will assume that the government
would have a great deal of control over the villagers. But

3 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993;
Sunday Examiner & Chronicle. March 13, 1977.

Sun Francisco
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villagers did not tell the same thing, and they argued among
themselves.1,4 According to the Powells, the list of scientists
and journalists who investigated the evidence is impressive,
and so was the exhibit that China held at the Asian Pacific
Peace Conference held in Beijing in October 1952.
Although Powell had heard about the Red hysteria in the
United States when he was in China, he never realized that it
was going to affect him and his family the way it did when
they returned to the United States. He did not know whether
his journal had ever been used to indoctrinate Americans in
prison camps, since, he said, he did not handle circulation
himself and the Review was available on any newsstand at that
time.
He emphasized that he is a "cause journalist" and that
his magazine was an opinion journal. He wanted to use the
magazine to fairly explain China to the West. He tried to
balance everything he wrote, but it was hard. "I was very
sympathetic with China because I thought China always got the
short end of the deal with the

West from the daysof theOpium

War on," he said. "If you read the American papersduring

the

same period, you could not find anything good about China in
them. They were not the textbook journalism.1,5
When the Justice Department pressed sedition charges
against the Powells, it maintained that Powell's writings were
4 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
5 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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presented as facts instead of mere opinions. Powell disagreed
and said his writings only represented his opinions. This
argument between Powell and the government was never resolved.
In retrospect, Powell said that if he had anticipated his
subsequent ordeal, he would have written the same thing, but
in a legally more cautious way. For example, in reporting the
germ warfare charges,

he would make it clearer that the

charges had been reported in China, and that he was offering
his opinions on their validity, based on the examination of
the evidence.
The lapse of time has not dried up Powell's interest in
germ warfare.
antique

In 1977, he retired to his study above his

shop to resume his writing about Asia

and germ

warfare. Today, to further prove the truthfulness of what he
had written during the Korean War, he has been trying to
obtain previously classified documents from the government
through the Freedom of Information Act.6
The sedition indictment charged Powell with wrongfully
accusing the United States of employing Japanese biological
warfare experts in the Korean War. However, recent evidence
tends to support Powell's contention. After years of research
and efforts to obtain classified government documents, Powell
found that during World War II, the Japanese had flown over
Chinese cities, dropping plague-laden insects and grains in
order to trigger an epidemic. What is more important is that
6 Powell interview, March 19-23,

1993.
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the Japanese honed their germ warfare weapons on captive human
subjects including many American prisoners of war. However,
the

American government had deliberately

concealed these

crimes to use the fruits of the research for its
own

biological

weapons

program.

Powell's findings

were

confirmed by various other sources.7
Japan's BW

experiments

were

directed by

Lieutenant

General Ishii Shiro. At the end of World War II, the American
military agreed that Shiro and others in his Unit 731 would
not be tried as war criminals. In return, Shiro turned over
the records of his experiments. Powell found a memorandum
dated Dec. 12, 1947, addressed to the head of the U.S. Army
Chemical Corps, which supplied a partial inventory of some of
the human experiments conducted by the Japanese.8
Powell's finding made international headlines when it was
published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in 1980 and 1981.
Dutch jurist, Bert V.A. Rolling, who served on
crimes

tribunal

after

World

WarII,

said

A

the Tokyo war
of Powell's

7 Discussions of Japan's experiment with germ warfare and
the U.S. subsequent use of Japanese BW personnel can be found
in at least two sources: Peter William and David Wallace, Unit
731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II. (New
York: The Free Press, 1988); and Mark Ryan, Chinese Attitudes
Toward Nuclear Weapons. China and the United States During the
Korean War. (Armonk, NewYork: M.E. Sharpe, 1989.)
8 John W. Powell,"A Hidden Chapter
in History,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. October 1981, pp. 37-44;
and "Japan's Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime,"
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. October-December 1980,
pp. 12-16.
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discovery: "It is a bitter experience for me to be informed
now that centrally-ordered Japanese criminality of the most
disgusting kind was kept secret from the court by the U.S.
government."9 This supports Powell's early reports about the
U.S. germ warfare program, but it is by no means evidence of
the alleged U.S. use of germ warfare techniques in the Korean
War.
Powell saw The China Monthly Review as his opinion
magazine. His statements in the Review that the United States
was an aggressor in Korea and that U.S. negotiators stalled
the negotiations were clearly opinions.

What about other

charges that America used gas and germ warfare in Korea, and
that casualties were of a certain number? At the first glance,
it would seem that these items have been presented as matters
of fact. But on closer examination they too can be seen as an
editor's opinions. After reading Powell's articles, no one
would seriously believe that the writer had actually been to
the battle field and had personally counted the dead and the
injured. In the germ warfare case, no reader would necessarily
assume that Powell had himself been present in a gas or germ
warfare attack.
In fact, Powell's statements on germ warfare took this
form: (a) charges of germ warfare have been made against the
United States; (b) he has examined published evidence which is
said to prove the truth of these charges; (c) in his opinion,
9 San Francisco Chronicle. Dec. 14, 1981.
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the evidence is sufficient to prove the charges true. Powell
was charged with attempting to influence public opinions and
to cause disloyalty; but only a few hundred copies of the
journal were circulated in the United States.10
Powell's defense of the Communists in China and his
laudatory reports about the new-born republic were a product
of history. He ran the Review during a unigue period of China
—

during the last three years of the Nationalists and the

first three years of the Communist rule. The corruption and
hopelessness of the Nationalists during their final days
contrasted with the great progress and improvements that the
Communists made after they took over the mainland. The first
three years of Communist rule were a period of euphoria. It
was difficult to balance the reporting, Powell acknowledged.
The Communists made a lot of mistakes, Powell said, but they
were nothing in comparison with those of the Nationalists.
Powell was not alone in holding this view at that time; most
Westerners who had been in China during the same period wrote
the same impressions about China. It must be noted, however,
that Powell did not stay in China long enough to see the
development of more serious problems, which culminated in the
Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Sguare.
The U.S.

government had its reasons for prosecuting

Powell and his co-defendants. The BW issue was, of course, a
sensitive issue, made more so by the fact that the United
10 The N a t i o n . Feb.

16, 1957. pp. 136-137.
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States had never signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing
chemical and BW warfare.

The subject became particularly

delicate because the United States had just dropped the atomic
bomb on another Asian country, and some people viewed that as
an racist action.
As the sedition case dragged on, the government was
caught in a dilemma. To prove the falsity of Powell's claims,
the government would have to reveal classified documents. Yet
to further tolerate Powell would be tantamount to admitting
that he was correct in his charges. Therefore, a mistrial
based

on

appropriate

some

technical

mistakes

may

solution for the government.

have

seemed

an

The defendants'

careers and lives were devastated because of the publicity of
their case, yet the government's denial of the

germ warfare

charges remained intact.
The U.S. government obviously had something to hide when
it sought to punish the defendants. Powell recalled that the
Justice Department tried to work out a deal with him— that is,
if Powell would plead guilty to any of the counts he had been
charged with, Sylvia and Schuman would be pardoned, and the
government would make the punishment for Powell very light.11
Powell's germ warfare charges remain unproved. Western
historiography of the Korean War has largely treated Chinese
charges

of

germ warfare as

an

isolated

and

transparent

propaganda ploy, whereas Chinese history books still treat it
11 Powell interview, March 19-23,

1993.
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as a matter of fact that the United States committed germ
warfare during the Korean War.12
Powell was simply the victim of the Red fear to the
extreme. When U.S. foreign service officers and other China
beat journalists returned to the United States after the
Chinese civil war, they were accused of losing China to the
Communists. Powell would have run into the same trouble had he
come home with them. Instead he stayed for three or four more
years.

His charges against the U.S. government were more

serious and that inevitably brought him more trouble with the
government.
An advocate of China, Powell took the side of the Chinese
Communists and was not very objective or thorough in his
reporting. Yet, an examination of his writing does not suggest
that he knowingly falsified anything. He did the best he could
to check out facts in the kind of environment he had in
Shanghai.
sources

He certainly lost his balance in using Chinese
almost

exclusively.

Still,

his

behavior

did

not

warrant the suffering that he and his family went through.
Powell's ordeal shows present journalists how difficult
it can be to cover a foreign,

especially an unfriendly,

country during time of war. When tension is high between
12 Detailed discussions of the alleged germ warfare by
Chinese scholars can be found in: Shen Zonghong and Meng
Zhaohui, History of the War to Resist Americans and Aid Korea
(Beijing: The Military Science Press, 1988); and Deng Liqun,
Ma Hong, and Wu Heng, China Today: War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea (Beijing: Press of Chinese Academy of
Social Science, 1990).
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nations, official newsmakers tend to manipulate the news media
to their own advantage. Journalists should always be skeptical
of official news sources. Otherwise the best-trained reporter
could easily lose his balance. On the other hand, foreign
corespondents are often accused of being unpatriotic if they
report things that people back home do not want to hear. What
happened to Powell and old China Hand journalists should give
pause to present-day journalists.
Today, when it comes to reporting on U.S. policies toward
China, U.S. news media tend to protect U.S. policies and
interests from public scrutiny. In comparison with the 1930s
and 1940s, there is a lack of diverse opinions in China policy
reporting today. The media have come to identify more and more
with policy-makers and have unwillingly become their surrogate
voice. The result of this is that today's reporting about
China tends to show a uniform pattern. If there is to be a
clear public understanding of China and U.S.-China relations,
journalists must be free to report diverse and sometimes
unpopular opinions.13

13 Chang, Tsan-Kuo. "Reporting U.S. China Policy, 19501985: Presumptions of Legitimacy and Hierarchy." The article
is included Chin-Chuan Lee's book: Voices of China.
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Appendix I
A Chronology of John William Powell
1919 July 3rd

born in Shanghai.

1920

went to the United States and stayed until
1926.

1926

went to China for a year, and attended the
American School in Shanghai for about a
year.

1927

returned to United States and went to
school in Hannibal and Columbia, Missouri
until May 1938.

19 38 September to
1940 May

went to University of Missouri to study
journalism and history.

1940 October to
1941 July

worked for China Press in Shanghai as a
reporter and staff writer.

1941 September to
1942 April

returned to University of Missouri to
study journalism.

1942 April to
December

worked
for
Commission in
December 1942.

1942 December to
1945 October

worked for the Office of War Information
in New York, Chunking, Kweilin, and
Kunming.

1945 October

The China Weekly Review was restarted by
Powell.

1947 December

married Sylvia Campbell.

1953 August

returned to United States after closing
the Review.

1954 September

testified before U.S.
Security Subcommittee.

1956 April

indicted for sedition.

1959 January

mistrial of sedition case after 5 days of
court hearings.

1961

sedition charge against Powell and his co
defendants dismissed by U.S. AttorneyGeneral Robert F. Kennedy.

Federal
Communication
Washington, D.C. till

Senate

Internal
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1963

opened antique shop. Also rehabilitated
houses and apartment houses for resale.

1972 November

first return trip to China since 1953.

1977

retired from antique shop to do research
and writing.

1980

published first article, in academic
journal, on Japanese germ warfare against
China. This and subsequent articles, based
on formerly secret materials found in U.S.
Government archives, detailed Japanese
atrocities and revealed U.S. government's
cover-up and protection of Japanese war
criminals. These articles were widely
reprinted in United States and abroad.
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